















The article explores how in Modernity and the Holocaust to his liquid turn 
writings Zygmunt Bauman’s work assumes that people live in a deterministic 
world. Bauman fails to distinguish agency as an analytical category in its own 
right and as such fails to capture self-determination, agential control and moral 
responsibility. All of Bauman’s work is based upon the assumption that the 
individual loses their autonomy and the ability to judge the moral content of their 
actions because of adiaphortic processes external to themselves as individuals 
giving rise to agentic state in which the individual is unable to exercise their 
agency. In contrast to the argument in Modernity and the Holocaust this article 
suggests that the Nazis developed a distinct communitarian ethical code rooted 
in self-control that encouraged individuals to overcome their personal feeling 
states, enabling them to engage in acts of cruelty to people defined as outside 
of the community. In his post-2000 work where the emphasis is on the process 
of liquefaction there is the same undervaluing of human agency in the face of 
external forces reflected in Bauman’s concepts of ambivalence, fate and swarm. 




2014 marks twenty-five years since the publication of Zygmunt Bauman’s most 
influential text Modernity and the Holocaust. The book established Bauman’s 
reputation as a critic of modernity and as a major European social thinker. In 
this book agential self-control has no role to play in Bauman’s explanation of 
the Holocaust and the undervaluing of human agency was to become a common 
theme in Bauman’s later postmodern and liquid turn. In particular, Bauman 
undervalues the human agent’s ability or power to choose and act otherwise and 
he does not acknowledge that an agent’s reason-states play a role in the causation 
of their actions. The now familiar argument developed in Modernity and the 










distinctly unique event, not a distinctly German event or mid-twentieth-century 
event. Bauman explored the idea that the Nazi state was the first example of a 
gardening state; a state that used its monopoly of violence to introduce effective 
engineering solutions to social problems, influenced by scientific management’s 
emphasis on technical efficiency, division of labour and good design to shape 
and control society. In spite of this, in Modernity and the Holocaust and in 
Bauman’s later work it is unclear how or if agency interpenetrates with the 
wider society or structure. Bauman’s work fails to distinguish agency as an 
analytical category in its own right. Bauman assumes that people live in a 
deterministic world and he fails to capture self-determination, agential control 
and moral responsibility. These are the three key concepts that would allow us 
to come to some understanding of why any individual is capable of engaging in 
such acts of face-to-face cruelty as was witnessed in the Holocaust. 
Agents in Bauman’s (1989) analysis are pushed about by the processes of 
rationalisation that are both external to the individual and exercise a constraint. 
It is not the agent that determines what to do on the basis of their own reasons or 
moral responsibility; rather it is the processes of rationalisation that determine 
the individual’s choices and actions. The absence of agency as an analytical 
category means that Bauman’s account does not explain how or why the events 
of the Holocaust occurred when and where they did. 
 
 
What is agency? 
 
Is there an ‘entity’ such as consciousness that is distinct from the world of our 
experience? Is there something in relation to mind, self or agency which is 
separate from the structure of the world itself? In Bauman’s analysis awareness, 
mindfulness and  realisation as  private  entities  appear  to  disappear, as  do 
the attitudes and emotions that one would normally expect to find a person 
exhibiting in a situation where cruelty towards the other is observed. Agency 
becomes passive or disconnected from the ability to check the emotion and 
behave differently. The penetration of bureaucratic reason into every sphere of 
social life, including the consciousness of the individual human agent, was a 
key factor transforming ‘the Jew’ from a living, breathing, individual human 
being into a morally indifferent category; process that was facilitated by the 
emergence of an adiaphoric state. The adiaphoric state is a common explanatory 
mechanism in Bauman’s analysis of solid modernity, including both Nazism 
and Stalinism, postmodernity and liquid modernity; it is the concept that 
Bauman draws upon to explain what it is that makes ‘ethical considerations 
irrelevant to action’ (Bauman 1999: 46). The agentic state is then the opposite 
of a state of individual autonomy and responsibility and was first defined and 
used by Stanley Milgram (1963) in his behavioural study of obedience. In terms 
of the Holocaust, the sociality of the face-to-face relationship was dispersed 









adiaphoric’ (Bauman 1993: 125) when authority for an action is removed from 
the agent’s behaviour; Individuals do not have to face the moral content of 
their actions, what Bauman describes as a situation of ‘floated responsibility’ 
(1993: 126) or what Hannah Arendt described as the ‘rule of nobody’ (1993: 
126). The adiaphoric state is rooted in a hatred of impurity. The processes of 
rationalisation impact directly upon the central nervous system, suspending 
moral agency to the degree that the moral content of an action is placed outside 
of the consciousness of the agent, in the same way that switching off the lights 
in a room makes us blind to the objects about us. Rationalisation simply enters 
the mind, brings about a set of behaviours and leaves without agency being 
affected by the contact or the experience. 
In his liquid turn writings, where the connection between agency and structure 
is not bureaucratically driven but described in terms of a liquid metaphor the 
reader is invited to view the connection between agency and structure as simply 
the simultaneous appearance of certain physical particles in a liquid flow and 
a selection of conscious states, with the process of liquefaction being the 
conditions for the appearance of the conscious state; a passive conditioning 
of consciousness by an involuntary, automatous and unfeeling process of 
liquefaction, with no mind and no sense of reflection. 
In Postmodern Ethics (1993) Bauman provides a philosophical underpinning 
of themes already discussed in Modernity and the Holocaust. In his work on 
postmodern ethics Bauman attempts to identify the nature of moral conduct 
in contemporary society. Bauman’s approach has been described by Shilling 
and Mellor (1998) and Ignatow (2010) as intuitionist in nature and based upon 
assumptions that objective moral truths exist and are independent of human 
beings that cannot be defined by reference to anything except other moral 
truths. Moreover it is intuition found within the individual as a given innate 
moral impulse (Bauman 1989: 188) that allows the individual to identify these 
objective moral truths. 
In contrast to conventional sociological opinion Bauman identifies cruelty 
with modernity and pre-societal social order with civilization and morality 
(Bauman, 1989: 177). By its nature modernity is hostile to difference/otherness 
(Bauman 1991: 104); this is what Bauman terms the ‘heterophobia thesis’. 
Bauman argues modernity makes the Holocaust possible by neutralising the 
‘primeval moral drives’ or innate moral impulse. However, within modernity 
an agentic state emerges and engulfs the individual human agent, generating 
moral irrelevance and dehumanisation of the other. For Bauman this process is a 
product of three interrelated strategies: the ’denial of proximity’; the ‘effacement 
of face’; and the ’reduction to traits’. 
Adiaphorisation is a product of the agentic state and includes stratagems for 
placing action outside of the moral–immoral axis; outside of moral evaluation 
and as such preventing the individual from exercising moral judgement in 









Christianity such adiaphoric acts are not understood by the agent as ‘sin’ and 
as such people can perform such acts free from stigma and moral conscience: 
‘In classic “solid” modernity, bureaucracy was the principal workshop in which 
morally loaded acts were remoulded as adiaphoric’ (Bauman and Donskis 
2013: 40). In liquid modernity this role of transforming morally loaded acts as 
adiaphoric has been taken over by the market. 
In In Search of Politics (1999) Bauman views the adiaphorisation process as 
the imposition of an ‘alien will’ onto the individual human agent. The individual 
may attempt to deceive the alien or rebel against the alien but: 
 
The fact remains that in all such cases the agents are not autonomous; they do 
not compose the rules which govern their behaviour nor do they set the range of 
alternatives they are likely to scan and ponder when making their big or small 
choices. (Bauman 1999: 79, original emphasis) 
 
Bauman explains: ‘The more rational is the organization of action, the easier 
it is to cause suffering – and remain at peace with oneself’ (Bauman 1989: 
155). The central argument developed in Postmodern Ethics was to provide 
an alternative to the bureaucratic morality that is found within organisations. 
Bauman (1993: 13–14) draws upon Levinas to support his argument that within 
each individual there is an innate moral impulse which is not connected or a 
product of any distinct social and historical formation. 
In Moral Blindness: the Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity by Bauman 
and Donskis (2013), Bauman returns to his account of the adiaphorising effects 
of social processes that encourage moral irrelevance and dehumanisation of the 
other. Bauman argues that we seem to be living through a period of interregnum; 
a period in the old system does not work and there does not seem to be a viable 
alternative currently available (Bauman and Donskis 2013: 83). 
 
The liquid modern variety of adiaphorization is cut after the pattern of the con- 
sumer-commodity relation, and its effectiveness relies on the transplantation of 
that pattern to inter-human relations. (Bauman and Donskis 2013: 15) 
 
Bauman ends up presenting a contradictory image of the individual who is on 
the one hand endowed with a moral impulse and on the other prevented from 
acting upon this impulse because of the adiaphorising effects of external social 
processes which prevent the individual from viewing their own actions as cruel 
or immoral and such adiaphorising effects are assumed to exist in all forms of 
solid and liquid modernity. 
Agency is commonly understood as something which underpins purposive 
individual action. Human agency is the capability or faculty that human beings 
possess that enables them to make choices and act otherwise rather than to act 
on the basis of deterministic processes or causal chains. There will always be 
a moral component to agency as the decision to act in one way rather than 
another will involve the person drawing upon internalised value judgements 









have taken. Agency is exercised through practice, used in the social world and 
formed by social relationships and institutions. However, many theories tend to 
focus solely on agency as decision-making and ignore the person’s capacity to 
make choices and the mechanisms that constitute an individual’s ability to make 
such choices. Where are the boundaries of agency to be found? 
Frances Cleaver (2007) identifies several factors that both limit and facilitate 
human agency: cosmologies, identities, unequal incomes, structure and voice, 
embodiment and emotionality. Identities are important for exercising agency 
because agency is exercised in relation to the perception of the self by others; 
hence age, gender, race and disability status can all impact on the individual’s 
ability to exercise agency. 
According to Hewson (2010) there are three main types of agency: 
 
•   Individual agency, which involves individuals making decisions and acting 
on the basis of the decisions that they have made. 
•   Proxy agency: one agent acting on behalf of another such as an employee 
acting on behalf of their employers; however this is not to suggest that 
proxy agents cannot act on their own behalf if they feel there is a divergence 
between the principal and agent. 
•   Collective agency, where individual agents choose to work together with a 
level of coherence, by for example pooling resources or choosing to work 
as a team; examples of collective agencies include states, classes and social 
movements. 
 
Hewson (2010) also suggests that there are three main abilities that human 
beings possess that give rise to agency; firstly although some actions can be 
described as action can be aimless, accidental, or unconscious human agents 
have intentionality, in that humans have the ability to act in a manner that 
is purposeful in that they perform actions that are deliberate with intended 
outcomes. Secondly, power is an aspect of agency in that all human beings 
have capabilities and access to resources that allow them to achieve their goals. 
Although Hewson (2010) acknowledges that because power is not equally 
distributed in society some have greater opportunity to exercise their agency 
than others. Thirdly, rationality is component to agency; human beings reflect 
on how it is possible to achieve their goals and draw upon their intelligence to 
guide their actions. Individuals also have the ability to evaluate the real and 
possible consequences of their actions. 
Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische (1998) describe their approach to 
agency as ‘relational pragmatics’ and attempt to break down the concept of 
agency into its component parts and view agency as the ability of individual 
people to critically develop their own responsiveness to challenging circum- 
stances. Emirbayer and Mische are attempting to overcome what they see as 
the one-sidedness of approaches that focus on either agency or on structure 









conceptualisation of agency is described by them as the ‘chordal triad’ in that 
they make a distinction between three dimensions or elements: 
 
1  The iterational element, which refers to: ‘the selective reactivation by actors 
of past patterns of thought and action, routinely incorporated in practical 
activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping 
to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time’ (Emirbayer and 
Mische 1998: 971). 
 
2  The projective element, which encompasses: ‘the imaginative generation by 
actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures 
of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors’ 
hopes, fears, and desires for the future’ (1998: 971). 
 
3  The practical-evaluative element, which entails: ‘the capacity of  actors 
to make practical and normative judgements among alternative possible 
trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and 
ambiguities of presently evolving situations’ (1998: 971). 
 
In summary, the iterational element is linked to the past; the projective to the 
future, the practical-evaluative is related to the present. Emirbayer and Mische 
argue that as ‘actors move within and among these different and unfolding 
contexts, they switch between (or ‘recompose’) their temporal orientations – 
and thus are capable of changing their relationship to structure’ (1998: 964). 
The ‘chordal triad’ leads Emirbayer and Mische to the suggestion that the ‘key 
to grasping the dynamic possibilities of human agency is to view it as composed 
of variable and changing orientations within the flow of time’ (1998: 964). 
They argue that the threefold distinction makes it possible to identify: ‘how the 
structural environments of action are both dynamically sustained by and also 
altered through human agency – by actors capable of formulating projects for 
the future and realizing them, even if only in small part, and with unforeseen 
outcomes, in the present’ (1998: 964). 
In contrast, Bauman’s social determinist approach takes the form of a 
reverse of Husserl’s ‘transcendental reduction’ in which he mentally puts into 
brackets assumptions of argentic self-control to get a fuller picture of the de- 
terministic processes that shape the social world. Culture, values and beliefs 
are ‘internalised’ so that self-control becomes an aspect of wider social control. 
It is tempting to look at later developments in our understanding of a more 
active and creative agency that emerged after the publication of Modernity and 
the Holocaust, notably following the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony 
Giddens. However, Bauman’s sympathetic reader could legitimately respond 
by suggesting that Bauman should not be criticised for his inability to anticipate 
and incorporate later developments in our understanding of agency and structure 
into his analysis. However, there were accounts available to sociologists at the 









maintenance of social formations that Bauman was aware of. As a critic of 
Talcott Parsons, Bauman would have had knowledge of the work of George 
Herbert Mead. In particular Mead’s understanding of a self-encompassed 
agency that had the ability to act in ways other than on the basis of internalised 
forms of social control. Any convincing account of the adiaphorising effects of 
external social processes needs to give a full and clear account of how a self-en- 
compassed agency was pacified and prevented from exercising. 
In ‘Evolution becomes a general idea’ (1936) Mead states his position in 
relation to Kant. For Mead, Kant conceived of the basic forms or categories of 
the world as given in the character of the mind itself and as such these categories 
exist in advance of experience. Without these basic forms or categories of the 
world there could be no meaning of reality. In contrast Mead took his starting 
point from the Romantic idealist stance that categories emerge from experience. 
Rather than making judgements about the meaning of the world on the basis of 
categories that exist in the mind in advance of experience; it is experience that 
brings these categories into existence. Experience creates its own forms. 
Mead viewed social structures as less organised than other social scientists 
at the time. Social structures were assumed to a ‘negotiated order’ in that they 
have no single goal, no agreed consensus but derive their goals from the diverse 
aims and objectives of the human agents through a process of negotiation. The 
individual was not passive or a reflection of a wider set of values and beliefs. 
The Romantic writers’ view that human agency had an active role to play 
in the shaping of the environment had a significant influence upon Mead. 
Mead focused upon social action; and self-reflexivity or action towards the 
self. Self-reflexivity is dependent upon language which people acquire from 
early childhood as a result of their participation in groups. Human perception 
is viewed by Mead as an activity in which people respond to stimuli selectively 
and symbolically with reference to self. We understand the actions of others 
through language and gestures. ‘Significant gestures’ or ‘significant symbols’ 
are ones that we are self-conscious about because we assume that they have 
meaning for the other and shape the ways in which the other relates to us. When 
acting in everyday life we take each other’s perspectives and interpretations of 
actions and this allows us to assess an action in communal terms. 
A central aspect of agency for Mead is the ability to step outside of one’s self 
to view ourselves as others see us. This is what underpins Mead’s well-known 
conception of ‘the generalised other’. As is also well known, Mead makes a 
distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ as two sides of the self. The ‘I’ is the 
impulsive aspect of self that contains our novelty and creativity, while the ‘Me’ 
is the social side of the self that controls and limits behaviour. Mead explained: 
‘you cannot have a subject without an object … you cannot have a consciousness 
of things unless there are things there of which to be conscious. You cannot have 
bare consciousness which is not consciousness of something. Our experience of 









involve the object in order that we may have consciousness … the assumption 
that the very existence of an object, as such, involves the existence of a subject 
to which it is an object’ (Mead 1936: 16–17). 
In addressing the same question that we are asking about Bauman’s work: 
Does consciousness exist? Mead assumes that there an ‘entity’ such as conscious- 
ness that is distinct from the world of our experience. Moreover, consciousness 
is something which is separate from the structure of the world itself, although 
Mead accepts that the term consciousness is an ambiguous one. Consciousness 
involves a relationship between agency and the world  of  objects that the 
agent shares within an environment. Mead presents a theory of knowledge as 
agreement based upon the cooperative conduct of thinking individuals. Unless 
a person is choosing to play the role of critic, individuals draw upon the attitude 
of the other in order to make sense of their own experience. Consciousness is 
viewed by Mead as a field or inner forum, a personal space that allows us to 
engage in self-reflection, in which the individual is the only actor and the only 
spectator; a place in which we ask questions and search for answers. 
One of the arguments that Bauman develops in relation to agency in 
Modernity and the Holocaust is a rejection of the ‘monster hypothesis’, the 
idea that the Holocaust was the product of the actions of sadists or people 
with evil intentions. Rather, for Bauman, moral standards came second to the 
technical success of the bureaucracy; and genocide is viewed by Bauman as 
neither abnormal nor a malfunction of modernity: ‘The Holocaust did not just, 
mysteriously, avoid clash with the social norms and institutions of modernity. 
Without modern civilization and its most central essential achievements, there 
would be no Holocaust’ (Bauman 1989: 87). 
What is more, argues Bauman, the story of the Holocaust could be made 
into a textbook of scientific management (1989: 150): ‘none of the societal 
conditions that made Auschwitz possible has truly disappeared, and no effective 
measures have been undertaken to prevent such possibilities and principles 
from generating Auschwitz-like catastrophes’ (1989: 11). ‘Modern civilization 
was not the Holocaust’s sufficient condition; it was however, most certainly its 
necessary condition’ (1989: 13). 
Unlike Mead’s reflexive self in Bauman’s analysis individuals in the agentic 
state accept any order that they are given as they no longer feel responsibility 
for the consequences of the actions taken. A form of ‘procedural reductionism’ 
is generated within the agentic state by the over-emphasis of organisational 
discipline over independent moral judgement; in the agentic state individuals 
are: ‘denied moral capacity and the ability to put freedom, if granted, to an 
acceptable use’; they are ‘“classified out” of moral self-sufficiency and self- 
management’ (Bauman 1993: 120). At best we can say that it is unclear how the 
‘procedural reductionism’ of organisational culture or discipline can prevent an 









As such Bauman’s argument undervalues the moral enormity of the Holocaust 
and the total collapse of humanistic values that underpinned the Holocaust 
as the worst moral disaster in human history. Bauman gives a description of 
people’s actions in terms of digging coal, driving trains, etc. but he does not 
investigate the individual lives and experience of Germans or Jews; there is no 
investigation of victim or perpetrator testimony, biography or autobiography. 
There is no account in their own words of what people did, why they did it, their 
feeling states, motivations, complex reflections, and choices made. Bernhard 
Loesener, for example, was a bureaucrat and Nazi perpetrator who was regarded 
as a ‘Jewish expert’ in the Nazi Interior Ministry for ten years. Loesener had 
the important role of drafting the Nuremberg Laws (1935) and later discrimina- 
tory legislation which stripped Germany’s Jews of their citizenship rights that 
was the corner stone of the Nazi legislative assault upon the position of Jewish 
people in German society. However, in his autobiography Loesener claims 
to have drafted the Nuremberg Laws in such a way that legally defined what 
constituted a Jew in as limited a way as possible. As such Loesener argues that 
he spared large numbers of Jewish people from the worst excesses of what the 
Nazis were attempting to do. Loesener claims that he was responsible for the 
Nazi hierarchy accepting the concept of ‘half Jews’, people with two Jewish 
grandparents, to be labelled as Mischlinge (or people of mixed race); such 
people did not have full citizenship rights but were not labelled as ‘full Jews’. 
The so-called Brown House planners such as Achim Gercke, the Nazi Party’s 
genealogical expert who in 1932 had drafted a policy proposal with the title 
‘Should German-Jewish Bastards Be Given Reich Citizenship?’ and had argued 
that people with ‘one drop of Jewish blood’ should be cast as Jews. There were 
similar debates and compromise leading up to the September 1941 decree that 
all Jews in public places had to wear an identifying Jewish star. Loesener claims 
that he was central in introducing the ‘privileged marriage’ clause into the legal 
framework. In a number of circumstances a marriage qualified as ‘privileged’ 
if a German spouse married a Jewish partner. Loesener claims that 100,000 
Jewish people were spared deportation to Auschwitz or the other death camps 
because of their ‘privileged marriage’ status. 
In November 1944 Loesener left the Interior Ministry after he found out 
about the mass murder of Jews in Auschwitz and the other death camps, he was 
expelled from the Nazi Party and arrested by the Gestapo for giving refuge to 
Captain Ludwig Genre, an intelligence office who was involved in an assassi- 
nation plot against Hitler in August 1944: 
 
Nothing could be further from my mind than to excuse or gloss over these laws. I  
regarded them as an outrage every minute of the two days it took to draft 
them. But for the historical record they need to be understood correctly, and this 
demands a closer look at the status of the ‘Jewish Question’ in the third year of the 








Whether you choose to accept or reject Bernhard Loesener’s account of his 
time at the Interior Ministry, one thing is clear – he was not engulfed within 
an agentic state and he did not judge the moral quality of his actions solely in 
terms of achieving bureaucratic objectives. According to Karl Schleunes (2001) 
Loesener’s autobiography is one of the most important surviving documents 
on the inner workings of the National Socialist regime of terror. Even critics 
of Loesener’s claims such as Cornelia Essner in her 1999 habilitation thesis, 
‘The system of the “Nuremberg Laws” (1933–1945)’ concludes that the value 
of his autobiography for the researcher should not be underestimated and Saul 
Friedlander (1997) concludes that there was no reason for Loesener to present a 
false picture of his actions or intentions. 
There is no account in Bauman of the motives and intentions of people such 
as Bernard Loesener, his ability to conceive of the world otherwise in relation 
to the emergence of new demands or circumstances and to act accordingly. 
Bauman cannot explain how or why people chose to act otherwise. How does a 
person come to reflect on their life and the conditions that they find themselves 
in? How could a person in an agentic state choose to act otherwise as Loesener 
chose to do? Loesener attempted to do something that Bauman’s agency could 
not do but something that Mead’s self could; attempt to manipulate or change 
the circumstances in which he found himself. 
Bauman simply assumes rather than explains how the process of rationalisa- 
tion underpinning modernity undermines morality. There is no reason to accept 
the agentic state assumption that is central to Bauman’s argument. We might 
want to argue, as did Weber, that our understanding of the world and how it 
works with modernity is diminished by the process of rationalisation, but there 
is no reason to suggest that our morality is similarly diminished. I know how 
to use the mobile phone, the internet and the HD television, I can make these 
devices do the things I want them to do but have only limited understanding of 
how the technology works; however there is no reason to suggest this rationali- 
sation process causes damage to my moral compass. 
 
 
The Nazi ethical code 
 
In contrast to Bauman’s view, within Holocaust scholarship there is an 
argument that rather than perpetrators being engulfed within an adiaphortic 
state, the suggestion is that perpetrators were conditioned into a distinct Nazi 
moral code rooted within a Nazi Weltanschauung. The Nazis’ ethical code was 
communitarian in orientation, in which the communitarian ethic was used to 
build a racially defined conception of community. This ethical code helped to 
shape the relationship between the individual and the community by providing 
guidance on practice. People remained responsible for their own actions and 
behaviours and their actions were considered to be ethical if they benefited the 








that stressed universal human rights were the ethics that underpinned the Diktat 
of Versailles and it was assumed that humanitarian liberal values had prevented 
German people from celebrating their German identity and discriminated 
against the German people by the imposition of blame for starting the war and 
the imposition of excessive reparations. As Jewish people were not part of the 
community and as such were exempt from ethical consideration. Nazi ethics 
was a morality of self-control; if the individual could overcome their personal 
feeling states, for example feelings of regret or remorse for engaging in acts of 
direct or indirect cruelty to people defined as outside of the community, this 
could be viewed as a form of personal sacrifice for the benefit of the community. 
The Nazi ethical code has much in common with Bauman’s conception of 
Mixophobia. Although for Bauman Mixophobia is based upon a ‘drive’ against 
difference and impurity within modernity rather than shared values in relation 
to a ‘community of similarity’; the concept describes a need for similarity and 
sameness or ‘we’ feeling in relation to common bonds and common experience. 
The values contained within the code stressed that the true worth of an individual 
was measured in terms of their contribution to the community and what the 
individual did in terms of their contribution to the maintenance of the society. At 
best Jews added nothing of value to the community, at worst they were a threat; 
people whose actions were responsible for the collapse of the home front in 1918 
that led to the German surrender. Even those people who did not accept the Nazi 
ethic, or changed their mind such as Bernhard Loesener were left in no doubt 
about which side of the conflict they were on. It is this refusal to engage with 
research into a distinct Nazi moral code rooted within a Nazi Weltanschauung 
that makes the events of the Holocaust remain incomprehensible for Bauman. In 
particular the lack of engagement with this scholarship means that Bauman can 
only explain the Holocaust from the perspective of the bureaucratic ‘desk killer’ 
such as Eichmann, who killed from a great distance and not from the perspective 
of the ‘ordinary men’ of the police battalions who killed unarmed Jewish men, 
women and children often face-to-face and often appearing to derive great 
pleasure from inflicting extraordinary pain, humiliation and unnecessary cruelty 
such as beard burning and the use of leather whips. Bauman attempts to explain 
why the perpetrators failed to recognise that what they were doing was evil 
by drawing upon the work of Stanley Miligram and Philip Zimbardo. What 
Bauman takes from their work is the suggestion that situational factors made 
people give up their moral responsibility and moral agency and behave in ways 
that brought about genocide. However, following a rule is still the act of human 
agency and requires interpretation and moral evaluation. 
From his analysis of actually existing socialism in Poland, to his attempt to 
describe socialism as an active utopia, sociology of post modernity and finally 
to his liquid turn writings there has been an underpinning common thread of 
determinism in Bauman’s work. Social action is always the product of general 








post-2000 work for example, where liquefaction is present given behaviours 
follow; with common themes in Bauman’s work such as ambivalence, fate 
and swarm. Although the source of ambivalence for Bauman is always located 
outside the agent, such ambivalence potentially threatens agency, by paralysing 
the agent’s self-control and strength of character, to the degree that the individual 
agent is unable to decide how to act or if to act at all. This form of ambivalence 
threatens the agent’s capacity to make free and independent decisions about 
themselves. As Tony Blackshaw explains: 
 
ambivalence is the creature of modernity, and people’s lives today more than any 
time in the past are governed by the contingency of events. If not going as far as 
saying that the ‘liquid’ modernity we today inhabit is a world where ‘anything 
goes’, Bauman reminds us that we share a ‘lighter, diffuse and more mobile’ 
sociality where there is no one set of constraints, no definitive set of rules. A 
liquid modernity in which people’s lives are indelibly stamped with ambivalence. 
(Blackshaw 2005: x) 
 
Bauman also explores the concept of ‘fate’ in a range of books: ‘something 
we can do little about, even though it is, at least in part, a summary past human 
choices and character’ (Bauman 2012: 25). Solidarity with liquid modernity is 
understood by Bauman with reference to the related concept of the swarm: ‘a 
massively copied style of individual behaviour’ (Bauman 2002: 7). The swarm 
replaces the group and is a conceptual device that Bauman uses to explain the 
process of social reproduction within liquid modernity. In a similar fashion to 
Gustave Le Bon’s argument in The Crowd, swarms are aggregates that emerge 
from the interaction of individuals at a ‘collective moment’ providing a mental 
unity, driving people to follow a collective direction. Swarms are composed of 
occasion-bound units of individuals who: ‘assemble, disperse and gather again, 
from one occasion to another, each time guided by different, invariably shifting 
relevancies, and attracted by changing and moving targets’ (Bauman 2007: 76). 
In Modernity and the Holocaust, the process of rationalisation could not be 
avoided by people as the events of the Holocaust unfolded; people had to think 
and act in a given way as rationalisation was both unstoppable and irreversible. 
In Modernity and the Holocaust and in his later work Bauman neither 
understands not attempts to explain the actions of individual people in terms 
of their agentic causes and as such he does not explore how individuals engage 
agentically within their structuring context. Bauman’s understanding of the 
individual is curiously impersonal in that what a person knows is not personal 
to them but widely known and with intentions to action formed externally from 
the self. My actions as an individual appear to have little or no connection with 
me as an individual. My mind has no role to play in my perception. Bauman 
argues that what is typical of modernity is the existence of a gulf between the 
right of self-assertion and the capacity of the individual to exercise control 
over the social settings in which they find themselves. People do not make 








become victims of fate. The gap between self and context cannot be spanned by 
individual effort alone as individuals do not have the capacity to influence the 
context in which they find themselves. 
In contrast, taking our starting point from a theorist such as Mead we could 
argue that agents always have knowledge of the ideas that they have inside 
their heads; they have to classify a thing as one thing or another by what it has 
in common with other similar objects in a category. We also have knowledge 
of ourselves, in the same way that we can look at our body as an object and 
make a decision if something is not right and if we need medical attention. 
So it is also the case with our intentions in relation to action and moral re- 
sponsibility.  As individuals with agency we have the ability to reflect on what 
we do and how and why we do what we do. In the last analysis, individuals 
have agency even in the most challenging of circumstances and as such always 
have the opportunity to exercise their intelligence and reason. Perpetrators 
had to identify individual characteristics present in a unique individual human 
being and decide if that unique individual should be classed as belonging to a 
wider category of asocials; Jew, homosexual, promiscuous woman, alcoholic, 
Communist. Once a person has been categorised as asocial a decision has to be 
made on the appropriate level of cruelty and humiliation. Social action is not 
possible without this reflexive capability. Bauman does not acknowledge the 
individuality or uniqueness of the individual. Such cruelty is both purposeful 
and creative and it is not based upon a rational cost/benefit analysis or guided by 
bureaucratic process alone. Even the most taken for granted habitual activities 
require the person to focus their attention on the action and to choose what they 
consider to be the appropriate way of behaving. All deaths in the Holocaust 
were unique, because all individuals were unique and each individual had a very 
different life history. What they did have in common was death at the hands of 
the same perpetrators. 
Bauman’s argument in relation to agency is unconvincing and problematic 
in many respects; not least because he assumes that the events that constituted 
the Holocaust were not determined by the agent’s own wishes, ideas or values 
but were determined by events and circumstances that were external to the 
individual who carried out the actions; the inhuman actions did not originate 
within the person who committed those actions and as such the agent is not 
the origin or source of their own actions. However, human agents always have 
the ability to act otherwise. Agents govern themselves, they have reason, know 
what they are doing, and they have responsibility over what they are doing. As 
Markus Ernst Schlosser points out: ‘the agent exercises control over an action 
simply by virtue of performing it’ (2008: 15). 
Not all the deaths during the Holocaust were carried out at a distance in 
a bureaucratic manner; there was a significant degree of cruelty and torture 
involved in the mass killings caused by exhaustion of slave labour, disease, 








common with pre-modern genocides rather than an efficient bureaucratic 
genocide. Snyder (2010) for example maintains that almost half of the Jews 
killed by the Nazis died from gunfire over pits; in addition death by starvation 
was also common. Both these forms of murder took place outside of the concen- 
tration camp system. Snyder provides a description of the events at Lutsk on 21 
August 1942 in which he explains how 
 
The Germans ate and drank and laughed, forced the women to recite: ‘Because I 
am a Jew I have no right to live’. Then the women were forced, five at a time, to 
undress and kneel naked over the pits. The next group then had to lie naked over 
the first layer of corpses, and were shot. (Snyder 2010: 223) 
 
Christopher Browning’s account of Police Battalion 101 also details examples 
of cruelty and inhuman behaviours by the Order Police that went much further 
than the orders that they were given; at Bialystok on 27 June 1941 the Order 
Police participated in actions such as beating with leather whips and beard 
burning, Browning describes the events that followed in the following terms: 
 
When several Jewish leaders appeared at the headquarters of the 221st Security 
Division of General Pflugbeil and knelt at his feet, begging for army protection, 
one member of Police Battalion 309 unzipped his fly and urinated on them while 
the general turned his back. … These men were not desk murderers who could take 
refuge in distance, routine, and bureaucratic euphemisms that veiled the reality of 
mass murder. These men saw their victims face to face. (Browning 1992: 37) 
 
In his personal reflections on his wartime experiences as a gay Jew living in 
wartime Berlin, Gad Beck (1999) discusses the case of his friend Paul Dreyer 
who was arrested in January 1945 and convicted for ‘aiding and abetting Jews’ 
and ‘treason’. During his interrogation his was beaten into admitting to the 
Gestapo that he was gay. Beck describes what happened: 
 
The poor idiot exposed himself as gay, in hopes that that might help him. Instead it 
brought him additional battering. I saw him again a few months after the liberation 
… he looked absolutely terrible and told me what had happened to him in prison. 
They had set two specially trained dogs on him – specialists in testicles and ears. 
He lost those body parts entirely; there wasn’t the slightest trace of outer ear to be 
seen, and he was virtually deaf. As concerns the other body part, he said all that 
was left was a hole for peeing. (Beck 1999: 148) 
 
 
How did the Nazis come to believe in their anti-Semitic ideas? 
 
Bauman does not investigate how the Nazis managed the Holocaust by avoiding 
a clash with the social norms and institutions of the day; it is simply not enough 
for Bauman to say that the situation came about ‘mysteriously’ (Bauman 1989: 
87). According to Gellately (2001) in March 1933, less than eight weeks after 
becoming Chancellor, Hitler called for a ‘moral purification’ of German politics 
restoring social values, social harmony and order by attempting to create a 








had lost their values and sense of community in the Weimar years. The Weimar 
Republic was characterised by the Nazis as a place where crime, drugs and 
organised criminal gangs were rife. Pornography, gay and lesbian lifestyles 
became acceptable within urban areas, particularly Berlin, and a new distinctly 
un-German culture was emerging in avant-garde forms of artistic work in 
music, performing arts and painting. The Nazis also identified ‘asocials’ such 
as Communists and others who were ‘politically criminal’, rapists, habitual 
criminals, repeat sex offenders, homosexuals, beggars, vagrants, the unemployed, 
prostitutes, alcoholics and drug addicts as threats to the community and gave 
the police force powers to remove these people into the protective custody of 
the military-style concentration camps for rehabilitation and re-education. As 
Germany prepared for war the camps grew in size and increasing numbers of 
Jews were incarcerated on grounds of ‘race defilement’. 
The official ban  on  sexual  and  friendly  relations  between  German  and 
Polish workers; the ‘radio measures’ which made listening to overseas radio 
broadcasts an offence and the vague but often used offence of ‘undermining the 
will to win’ were maintained by ‘police justice’ in which the decision to execute 
or send accused individuals to a concentration camp was taken by the Gestapo. 
These actions were taken without reference to the courts and had no basis in 
law. The Gestapo would also on occasion ‘correct’ a court decision and place an 
individual in the ‘protective custody’ of a concentration camp. 
In August 1941 Hitler decided to end the killing of people who had ‘lives 
unworthy of living’ such as the killing of ‘handicapped’ children and mentally ill 
adults who were incapable of working. Public opinion surveys on such ‘mercy 
killings’ demonstrate that such actions did not have the full support of the 
population. This example suggests that the population did not accept the actions 
of the Nazis without question and the Nazis did not continue with actions if they 
were assumed to lack community support. 
For the Nazis the rights of the individual came second to the protection of the 
community and legal rights were only given to individuals who were identified 
as useful members of the community. This communitarian stance devalued the 
private sphere of a person’s individuality. From 1934 onwards the Propaganda 
Ministry instructed the press to report on death sentences and exclusions to 
concentration camps in such a way that it would: ‘’awaken in the impartial 
reader the feeling for the necessity and internal justification’ for such actions’ 
(Hauptstaatsarchiv Dusseldorf 18/d3, 19 cited in Gellately 2001: 49). The role 
of Nazi propaganda was not to brainwash people but to provide recognition of 
a spiritual quality in the attitudes and behaviours of other Germans and at the 
same time provide a vision of what one should recognise in oneself, helping 
to strengthen and intensify co-operative social relationships and enhancing the 
ability to recognise oneself in the many as the basis of sociality and community. 
It is this communitarian aspect of the ethical code that allows us to view the 








that front line soldiers were asked to take the life of strangers, Germans at home 
were asked to share the burden with soldiers in the field by engaging in viewing 
Jews and others as not part of the community and putting aside their personal 
feelings in relation to observing harsh treatment against them for the good of 
the wider community. 
The Nazis promised a return to pre-Weimar culture and this stance was 
popular amongst many German people. To gauge the degree of popularity 
Gellately points to the elections and plebiscites that the Nazis conducted, such 
as the national plebiscites to withdraw from the League of Nations and unite the 
post of Head of State with the Head of Government both of which were given 
the support of over 90 per cent of the German people. The ‘Day of the Police’ 
was introduced by the Nazis in 1934 as an opportunity for German people to 
celebrate the role of the police in maintaining public safety; such celebrations 
were also widely accepted and enjoyed. 
An approach that places an emphasis on a Nazi ethical code also provides 
some idea of the connection between old and new anti-Semitism that did 
exist and captures this connection historically and at least partly explains 
something that Bauman cannot explain: how anti-Semitism was transformed 
into genocide., rather than accepting Bauman’s argument which is based upon 
affinity between perpetrator and victim, which is likely to blur the distinction 
between the victims and the murderers as both were victims of the rationalising 
processes of modernity. What is important is the division between perpetrator 
and victim and the ethical code that unites the perpetrators against the victim. 
David Deutsch (2012) asks the question: How did the Nazis justify and 
explain the mass killings they perpetrated? Like Bauman, Deutsch points to de- 
humanisation as a factor that enabled Nazi perpetrators to remain unmoved by 
the fate of the victims. Because the Jews and other victims were regarded as not 
human, their suffering did not matter. However, unlike Bauman, Deutsch asks, 
how do we explain the emergence of this dehumanisation and the subsequent 
cognitive transformation undergone by the persecutors; as Deutsch points out: 
‘Dehumanization was no mere metaphor under the Nazi regime; it was a living 
reality’ (2012: 10). 
Deutsch argues that the Nazis claimed to have an inner understanding of the 
demonic and secretive Jewish essence from within. Giving this contention a 
level of credibility in their rhetoric and propaganda provided the starting point 
for Nazi persecution. 
In interpreting the Holocaust Alon Confino (2005) takes his starting point 
from research that focuses on the experience of Germans and Jews, notably 
Omer Bartov’s research on the German army, Christopher Browning’s Ordinary 
Men and Saul Friedländer’s Nazi Germany and the Jews, to argue that academics 
must come to terms with the way in which the Nazis manipulated culture, how 








about Jewish people and how German society came to believe and internalise 
such ideologically motivated fantasies: 
 
It is common to assert that one of Nazism’s main characteristics is that it emerged 
from the structures of modern industrial society. It is true, but I wonder whether 
it says more about historians’ difficulty in interpreting Nazism than about Nazism 
itself. As a historical occurrence that happened in twentieth-century Germany 
and Europe, what alternative did Nazism have but to be modern, industrial and 
scientific? The modern, industrial, scientific characteristics were the symptom of 
their age, not the meaning of Nazism. They should not be viewed as the quin- 
tessential causes of the regime. The goal was to build a racial civilization at the 
centre of which was the fight against the Jews (1933–41) and ultimately their total 
elimination (1941–45). (Confino 2005: 312) 
 
Peter Haas (1988) for example argues that the people responsible for the 
Holocaust were not only ordinary people but more typically, ‘idealists’ guided 
by a coherent and comprehensive ethical code that emerged from a Nazi 
Weltanschauung: 
 
The Holocaust is not the result of absolute evil but of an ethic that conceives of 
good and evil in different terms … . That is why the horrors of Auschwitz could 
be carried on by otherwise good, solid, caring human beings. (Haas 1988: 179) 
 
Similarly, drawing upon Hans Hefelmann’s testimony at the Hadamar Trial in 
Frankfurt in 1964, Larry Ray casts doubt on the validity of the agentic state. 
Perpetrators were fully aware of the consequences of their actions and were 
fully supportive of the Nazi project, argues Ray, going on to quote Hefelmann 
as saying: ‘I have never been in doubt that legally and in matters of humanity I 
acted correctly’ (Ray 2011: 182). 
More recently Wolfgang Bialas (2013, 2014) has investigated the rationale of 
what he considers to be a coherent system of Nazi ethics which was composed 
of convictions, values and ideas that guided behaviour and clearly identified 
actions as moral or immoral. Bialas draws upon a wide range of sources 
(Fritzsche 2009; Gellately 2002; Hilberg 1992, Johnson 2002, Kershaw 2009, 
Klee et al. 1996, Littell 2009, Peukert 1989; and Pollefeyt 1999) to support 
his argument that this moral conditioning into a system of beliefs helped 
individuals to develop a conscious moral construct which rejected a universal 
ethics of humanism for an ‘ethnic conscience’ which limited an individual’s 
moral obligations to members of their own race, viewing others such as Jews 
as a potential threat to the community. Robert Gellatelly (2002), Eric Johnson 
(2006) and Peter Fritzsche (2009) in particular maintain that the Third Reich 
depended more on consent than it did on coercion. Rather than pointing to 
an agentic state, Bialas suggests that many Germans shared a Nazi ideology; 
that valued racial belonging over personal interests or feeling states. People 
developed a clear moral orientation which allowed them to treat some people 








morally innocuous, with humiliation, persecution and in the last analysis killing 
of ‘the Jews’ was the right thing: 
 
Racial biological naturalism declared humans to be vehicles of higher principles 
and reduced them to members of a race either doomed to destruction (if they 
happened to be Jews), or destined to rule the world (if they were members of the 
Nordic race, like the Germans). (Bialas 2013: 4) 
 
The Nazis were committed to the holiness and inviolability of the Aryan 
human life but other races were given an inferior status, or in the case of the 
Jews, the status of enemies of the people. A universal ethics of humanism would 
lead to racial degeneration; in developing his argument Bialas draws upon 
Didier Pollefeyt’s understanding of a Nazi ethic: 
 
The Nazis knew what they were doing, they found these facts morally acceptable, 
and they acted consciously and creatively in accord with this new moral sense. 
The Germans were not suddenly deprived of their capacity to distinguish good 
from evil. They did not act out of purely immoral desires or out of moral insensi- 
tivity, but precisely because they were ethically sensitive. Nazism was sustained 





Is an elaborate theory of agency needed to explain the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of 
the Holocaust? Bureaucratic organisations are regarded by many as the most 
efficient form of organisation. Organisations can be directed to manufacture 
cars, produce hamburgers or commit genocide and will do so in the most efficient 
manner possible. However, we should never lose sight of the uniqueness of 
an individual and their ability to make choices. Bureaucratic organisations in 
themselves lack both direction and agency; organisations have to be provided 
by people with goals, objectives and resources. Agent reason states are causal 
mechanisms in terms of bureaucratic action; people have to engage in decision 
making before making use of the bureaucratic organisation as a tool to achieve 
their objectives. Bauman may provide an informed outline of some aspects of 
the context in which the Holocaust took place. He gives a reasoned account of 
how the ‘desk killers’ were freed from the physical proximity of their victims 
and as such could avoid some of the moral content of their actions. However, 
not all the individuals killed died within the context of rational bureaucratic 
systems and even those who did came face-to-face with their killers. 
For Bauman perpetrators were engulfed in an agentic state, they experienced 
adiaphoria, they lost the ability to reflect upon the moral content of their own 
actions and chose to view such actions as the achievement of bureaucratic goals. 
However, if the Holocaust was a product of processes of rationalisation found 
in all modern societies and not a consequence of modernity going wrong or a 
product of agency, then Bauman needs to explain why at the end of the Second 








bureaucracy was in place, as were the transport links and rest of the necessary 
infrastructure for mass genocide. The answer is that the Allies had no political 
will to engage in what had become by the end of the war a process of factory 
killing. 
An effective understanding of the Holocaust needs to engage in a discussion 
of what distinguishes better from worse in agentic processes. There also needs 
to be an understanding of how and why the Nazi ideological reconstruction 
of the social world in Germany and many of the occupied territories was so 
successful. Finally there needs to be an understanding of the emergence of a 
distinct Nazi ethics that allowed people to judge their actions as right and just. 
In particular there needed to be an account of the communitarian aspect of the 
Nazi ethic; how personal feelings of the individual human agent that might come 
into conflict with the perceived needs of the community were subordinated 
for the good of the people. Such ‘moral’ actions were not subjected to a form 
of rationalisation or regarded as fulfilling the requirements of a bureaucratic 
task but became a choice of culture and society over personal feeling states; 
choosing to do something which was understood to benefit the community but 
which may cause distress to oneself.  Bauman’s argument is not based upon 
exhaustive research of individual people’s lives or similar empirical findings 
and does not address the cultural making of Nazi values and beliefs in under- 
standing the Holocaust.  In his attempt to understand the Holocaust Bauman 
has a tendency to confuse a description of what happened with an explanation 
of why it happened.  The extermination of millions of people happened not 
because of processes, but because of the actions of human beings who wanted 
the outcome of the processes they were involved in. 
Bauman has a tendency to view the Nazi regime as a movement without 
a coherent world-view or ideology. The Nazis constructed their own racially 
motivated communitarian morality, along with their own version of civilisation 
and who should be included within ‘humanity’. From a Nazi perspective there 
was no such thing as rights before the law for Jews and other asocials; such 
rights were only being granted to members of the Volksgemeinschaft, with the 
excluded subjected to ‘police justice’. It was the acceptance of this ‘ethical’ 
stance that allowed previously moral individuals to engage in acts of great 
cruelty, in close proximity including face-to-face encounters with others they 
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